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In this paper, we examine stock exchange trading rules for market manipulation, insider 
trading, and broker-agency conflict, across countries and over time, in 42 stock exchanges around 
the world.  Some stock exchanges have extremely detailed rules that explicitly prohibit specific 
manipulative practices, but others use less precise and broadly framed rules.  We create new 
indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency conflict based on the specific 
provisions in the trading rules of each stock exchange.  We show that differences in exchange 
trading rules, over time and across markets, significantly effect liquidity. 
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 Stock exchanges around the world invest considerable manpower, technological effort, 
and financial resources to curb market manipulation and promote market efficiency and integrity 
(Aitken and Siow, 2003; Avgouleas, 2005; Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006).  It is widely 
regarded that securities law (La Porta et al., 1998, 2006; Jackson and Roe, 2009) and market 
microstructure (Harris et al., 2008) play an important role in the development of stock markets 
around the world.  Despite these important developments in the literature, there has been a dearth 
of attention paid to the differences across exchanges with respect to the treatment of market 
manipulation within their trading rules.   
 
In this paper, we document international differences in trading rules for stock or equity 
exchanges, and examine the impact of market integrity rules on the performance of equity 
marketplaces.  Specifically, we study the differences in regulation across 42 exchanges 
worldwide during the time period of 2006–2008 and then proceed to investigate whether 
integrity-related exchange trading rules matter for market liquidity. For the purposes of this paper 
“trading rules” refer to the rules and regulations that regulate the activities within a stock market 
and the conduct of its participants, namely the exchange and the members of the stock exchange 
who agree to be bound by such rules and regulations. 
 
We create new indices for trading rules pertaining to market manipulation, insider 
trading, and broker-agency conflict for these 42 stock exchanges in both developed and emerging 
markets.  For the purposes of this paper, market manipulation refers to the trading practices that 
distort prices and enable manipulators to profit at the expense of other market participants.  
Insider trading refers to acting on material non-public information.  Broker-agency conflict refers 
to the actions that brokers might take while acting as the agent of a client that benefits the broker 
(or some other affiliated party) at the expense of the client or the market more generally.  Some 
stock markets such as NASDAQ have extremely detailed rules that explicitly prohibit specific 
manipulative practices and broker-agency conflict, as well as rules that are designed to curtail the 
presence of insider trading.  For example, NASDAQ's rules provide detailed provisions regarding 
wash trades, pre-arranged trading, fictitious orders, giving-up priority, churning, front-running, 
and a variety of other types of practices (all of which are defined herein) that constitute market 
manipulation. Other exchanges are less precise and have broadly framed rules regarding what 




In view of the significant differences in the way trading rules regulate market 
manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency conflict across countries and over time, it is 
worth considering whether these differences matter.  To this end, in addition to documenting the 
differences in trading rules and developing new indices of market surveillance, we examine 
whether the differences in trading rules can help to explain the differences in liquidity among 
exchanges.  Specifically, we examine whether there is a correlation between trading rules and a 
series of liquidity measures that include velocity, volatility, and relative bid-ask spread.  The 
primary function of a marketplace is to provide liquidity to market participants. The effectiveness 
of an exchange is affected by its rules that regulate security transactions. We consider two 
competing hypotheses regarding the impact of trading rules on liquidity. On one hand, one can 
argue that vague regulations create inefficiency as investors and/or traders are not clear as to 
which activities are acceptable and which ones are in breach of the rules. Detailed rules, 
therefore, might give rise to greater investor confidence, greater dissemination of knowledge 
about prohibited conduct, and facilitate invigilation of such rules, which in turn might reinforce 
investor confidence in the marketplace. As a result, these rules might help to improve trading 
activity, reduce uncertainty, and decrease trading cost.  Conversely, one might argue that detailed 
regulations create inefficiency as investors and/or traders are able to take advantage of inevitable 
loopholes, and if so, more detailed exchange rules might have a negative effect on liquidity.   
 
Although exchanges do not amend their rules very frequently, there are nevertheless 
amendments to rules over time. Most notably for European exchanges, in November 2007 the 
Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) became effective and thereby gave rise to 
more detailed rules and more transparent investor protection for the European exchanges.  
Although some European exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange, already had in place 
trading rules that were analogous to the new rules in MiFID, others such as the Austrian exchange 
had significantly less detailed rules prior to MiFID. Because the introduction of MiFID only 
effects the countries of the European union, it creates a natural experimental setting in which to 
assess the impact of exchange rule restrictions on trading activity. In this paper, we exploit this 
setting to shed light on our research question by examining the dynamics of the market liquidity 
measures between the two groups of exchanges around the introduction of MiFID. Because 
MiFID is introduced as a major part of the European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) rather than as a result of one single jurisdiction’s need to improve the regulation, 
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endogeneity issues that relate rule changes to market outcomes are minimized in our experimental 
setting.   
 
The data presented in this paper show a strong and robust effect of trading rules on 
liquidity.  Detailed trading rules are positively associated with velocity and negatively associated 
with volatility and bid-ask spreads.  We show this effect with panel data that varies across time 
and countries by considering a variety of robustness checks that include, but are not limited to, 
fixed-effects modeling and difference-in-differences tests.  To isolate the influence of the trading 
rules, we also control for a number of plausible factors that might effect trading activity based on 
prior academic works, including exchange institutional features (Röell, 1992), market 
microstructure aspects (Stoll, 2000) and international differences in securities regulation (La 
Porta et al., 2006; Jackson and Roe, 2009) among other things.  The effect of rules on liquidity is 
robust to controls for economic, legal, and institutional differences across exchanges that might 
have been correlated with country differences in drafting trading rules.  This strong evidence is 
due to the fact that exchanges that specifically recognize and prohibit certain acts in the 
marketplace enhance investor confidence.  As well, exchanges with more specific rules invariably  
have residual "catch-all" clauses that explicitly outline the spirit of the rules and regulations and 
prohibit a vaguely defined "any other type of manipulative activity" such that (arguably) there is 
scant scope for exploiting potential loopholes.   
 
A few recent papers are closely related to our own.  La Porta et al. (2006) and Jackson 
and Roe (2009) show that securities law matters for facilitating stock market development in 49 
exchanges around the world.  Aitken and Siow (2003) provide a ranking of exchanges based on 
efficiency and integrity. Cumming and Johan (2008) provide survey evidence that surveillance 
technology and information sharing facilitate market integrity.  Hail and Leuz (2006), Daske et al. 
(2008) and Lampert et al. (2007) show that stronger securities law, accounting rules, and stricter 
enforcement mechanisms lower firms’ cost of capital.  The findings in these papers are consistent 
with a broader literature on the importance of securities regulation and market surveillance for 
market efficiency and integrity.1  More generally, our paper contributes to the general question of 
                                               
     
1
 See, e.g., Aggarwal (2001), Aggarwal and Wu (2003), Allen and Gale (1992), Allen and Gorton 
(1992), Carson (2003), Clayton et al. (2006), Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), Comerton-Forde and 
Tang (2007), Daouk et al. (2006), DeMarzo et al. (2005), Gerard and Nanda (1993), Harris (2006), Harris 
(2002), Hillion and Suominen (2004), Jarrow (1992, 1994), Kumar and Seppi (1992), La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, 1999, 2002, 2006), Mahoney (1999), Merrick et al. (2005), Ni et al. (2005), Pagano et al. (2001, 
2002), Peng and Röell (2009), O’Hara and Mendiola (2003), Pirrong (1993, 1995a,b, 1999, 2004), Pistor et 
al. (2003), Pistor and Wu (2003, 2005), Prichard (2003), Reiffen and Robe (2007), Romano (1993, 2001, 
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the value of broadly framed versus specific rules in regulating markets and society (see, e.g., 
Ferguson and Peters, 2003; Stevenson, 2005).   
 
In this paper, we provide a novel source of information for understanding the sources of 
international differences in stock exchanges.  We show that stock exchange trading rules, which 
specify in detail rules that pertain to market manipulation, facilitate trading activity.  The 
implication is that an exchange’s trading rules are an important source of international differences 
in stock markets.  This information is very transparent and readily visible for use in future 
research.  An index of exchange trading rules is provided herein. 
 
 This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes stock exchange trading rules and 
the creation of an index for exchange surveillance.  The data are introduced in Section 3.  Section 
4 presents multivariate analyses of the relation between the exchange surveillance index and 
trading activity.  Concluding remarks follow in the last section. 
 
2. The indices of exchange trading rules and hypothesis 
 
In this section, we explain forms of market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-
agency conflict, and build indices for stock exchange trading rules. Rules can be broken down 
into one of three types: rules designed to mitigate insider trading, rules designed to limit market 
manipulation, and rules designed to limit broker-agent conflicts. Each are described immediately 
below. 
 
2.1. Indices of exchange trading rules 
 
2.1.1. Insider trading rules index 
 
Insider trading refers to a market participant who acts on material non-public 
information.  Although rules prohibiting insider trading in general are commonplace around the 
world, specific regulations governing market participants with respect to insider trading differ 
significantly across exchanges. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2002) and Vitale (2000). 
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Insider trading can take many different forms, two of which involve brokers using the 
information of a client order: client precedence and front-running.  Client precedence refers to 
brokers violating the time priority of client orders.  A client precedence rule is violated during 
insider trading when a broker initiates a trade on his own account shortly ahead of the execution 
of a client's order, with the client’s trade being executed at a worse price.  Front-running likewise 
refers to brokers trading ahead of clients' orders.  In the case of front-running, upon receipt of a 
large client order, a broker trades shortly prior to a client's order with the expectation that the 
client's order will move the price.  Front-running can also involve brokers that, after receiving a 
client's order, take the opposite position to the client's order in the market without the client’s 
knowledge and then, immediately thereafter, the same broker crosses with the same client off-
market at a profit. 
 
Other forms of insider trading can involve the use of material non-public information 
about the company being traded.  Trading rules can mitigate the presence of this form of insider 
trading by prohibiting trading ahead of the public release of research reports created by 
brokerages, and the separation of research and trading departments at brokerages (commonly 
referred to as "Chinese Walls").  As well, rules that limit affiliation between exchange members 
and member companies, or between members and their investment company securities, mitigate 
the flow of information that might be material and non-public.  Rules can also provide details 
with respect to the nature of communication between brokerages and the public by regulating 
how the flow of material non-public information is released. Further, trading rules sometimes 
limit brokerage ownership, the extent to which brokerages can influence or reward employees of 
others, or ban anti-intimidation and/or coordination activities (e.g., to stop people from reporting 
illegal activities). These restrictions can have the effect of limiting the flow of material non-
public information.2 
 
2.1.2. Market manipulation rules index 
 
Market manipulation rules encompass price manipulation, volume manipulation, 
spoofing, and disclosure manipulation. 
 
                                               
     
2
 In some countries the probability of detection of insider trading is low and even upon deterction 
and prosecution, the ensuing fines are also low.  We considered separate variables for insider trading laws 
around the world (Beny, 2005), among others, but those variables did not materially impact the results 
presented here regarding the market manipulation index and trading velocity. 
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2. 1.2.1. Price manipulation rules index 
 
Price manipulation can be carried out in many different ways and take many forms. One 
common way is where one broker (or colluding brokers) enters purchase orders at successively 
higher prices to create the appearance of active interest in a security, which is also termed as 
ramping/gouging.  This can also take the form of pump and dump schemes whereby exchange 
participants generate a significant increase in price and volume for a security, carry out a quick 
flip, and the securities are then sold (often to retail customers) at the higher prices.  Another 
similar type of price manipulation takes the form of pre-arranged trading.  Pre-arranged trades 
involve colluding parties simultaneously entering orders at an identical price and volume.  
Because pre-arranged trades avoid the order queue, they can influence the price of a security. 
 
 
Price manipulation can be carried out through domination and control, and take the forms 
of corners or squeezes in cross-market activity.  Corners and squeezes involve shortages in one 
market that can affect the price of a cross-market security  A corner involves securing control of 
the bid- or demand-side of both the derivative and the underlying asset, and the dominant position 
can be exploited to manipulate the price of either.  A squeeze involves taking advantage of a 
shortage in an asset by controlling the demand-side and exploiting market congestion during such 
shortages in a way that creates artificial prices.  Another related form of manipulation includes 
mini-manipulations whereby trading in the underlying security of an option is carried out in order 
to manipulate its price so that the options will become in-the-money (Merrick et al., 2005). 
 
Price manipulation can also be carried out to take advantage of market setting whereby 
brokers cross-order at the short-term high or low to effect the volume weighted average price, or 
to set the price in one market for the purpose of a cross in another market.  
 
Three different forms of price manipulations refer to a specific time period: marking the 
open with regard to the opening of the market, marking the close with regard the closing of the 
market, and trades to manipulate prices at end of the month/quarter/year.  The opening session 
can be subject to particular types of manipulation subject to the rules for entering bids and asks in 
the pre-opening session.  Similarly, end-of-day trades may be geared towards manipulating the 
closing market price of the security, and exchanges often specifically prohibit this type of act.  
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Financial record keeping among companies provides incentives to manipulate share prices around 
the end of the month/quarter/year that depend on the governance specific to the company. 
 
2. 1.2.2. Volume manipulation rules index 
 
Volume manipulation can take two primary many forms: churning and wash trading. 
Churning refers to the excessive trading of a stock to inflate its volume thereby giving rise to the 
false impression that there is investor sentiment for the stock.  While we recognize that the 
churning of client accounts may be carried out by traders and/or brokers to generate commission 
fees, given that the end result of churning is to manipulate markets, and that the central 
motivation of traders and/or brokers in churning both house accounts and client accounts is to 
manipulate the appearance of volume, we have deemed churning as a form of volume 
manipulation.  
 
Wash trading, another form of volume manipulation, means having the same client 
reference is on both sides of a trade.  While there is no beneficial change in ownership, wash 
trades have the effect of creating a misleading appearance of an active interest in a stock.  We 
realize that wash trades can indirectly effect price, but we consider wash trades to more 
significantly affect volume.  As such, wash trades are categorized as part of volume manipulation. 
 
2. 1.2.3. Spoofing manipulation rules index 
 
Spoofing, also known as “painting the tape”, is a form of market manipulation that 
involves actions taken by market participants to give an improper or false impression of unusual 
activity or price movement in a security.  Some trading rules have very general statements of 
prohibition towards actions that give rise to a false appearance.  Other exchanges more explicitly 
indicate ways in which false appearance might be created, which includes fictitious orders, giving 
up priority, layering of bids-asks, and switches.  The more general act of entering fictitious orders 
involve entering orders on one side of the market, then completing orders on the other side of the 
market and deleting the original order after the trade occurs.  Giving up priority refers to deleting 
orders on one side of the market as they approach priority and then entering the order again on the 
same side of the market.  Layering of bids-asks refers to traders or brokers that stagger orders 
from the same client reference at different price and volume levels to give the misleading 
impression of greater interest in the security from a more diverse set of exchange participants, and 
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might be viewed as being carried out for the purpose of manipulation.  Switches involve deleting 
orders on one side of the market as they approach priority and then entering the order again on the 
opposite side of the market.  These distinctions are somewhat subtle but nevertheless these 
different scenarios are explained in detail in some exchange trading rules. 
 
2. 1.2.4. False disclosure rules index 
 
 Distinct from insider trading rules, some rulebooks include information pertaining to 
false disclosure.  For instance, market participants might actively distribute false or misleading 
information that has the effect of distorting the marketplace.  Alternatively, there can be a failure 
to disclose information such as the mandatory disclosure of ownership interests when they reach 
threshold level.  This latter form of manipulation is commonly known as parking or warehousing.   
 
 Overall, we refer to trading rules pertaining to price manipulation, volume manipulation, 
spoofing, and false disclosure as the market manipulation rules.  Below, we aggregate these rules 
to form separate indices for each, which we refer to as subcomponent indices. Then we combine 
them in their sum total to form the Market Manipulation Rules Index, one of the three primary 
legal indices we are creating in this paper.  These indices are considered separately from insider 
trading rules and broker-agency conflict rules, which form the other two primary indices. 
 
2. 1.3. Broker-agency conflict rules index 
 
 Brokers act on behalf of clients, but can do so in ways that are against client interests.  
This type of principal agent problem may arise from the failure of the broker to obtain the best 
price for a client (commonly known as a breach of a trade through obligation3), the broker 
charging excessive fees, or acting in ways that are generally detrimental to client interests such as 
by investing in securities that do not match the risk/return profile of the client (referred to as 
breach of the "know-your-client rule").  As well, brokers might use the exchange’s name 
improperly in marketing their services, or carry out other forms of improper or unethical sales and 
marketing efforts.  For broker-agency conflict rules, we use information explicitly indicated in the 
rules of the exchange, and not guidelines from professional associations such as the Chartered 
Financial Analysts ethics guidelines and the like. 
                                               
     
3
 In the U.S., this obligation was released under Regulation NMS and published in the federal 




Table 1 outlines the different types of manipulation described in stock exchange trading 
rules.  The trading rules for a stock exchange are drafted with varying degrees of specificity as 
they outline the exchange membership requirements, listing requirements, trading rules and 
regulations, and especially trading practices that are prohibited.   
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
Each of the different rules for insider trading, market manipulation, and broker-agency 
conflict described in the exchanges’ trading rules are weighted equally in the indices used in this 
paper.4  The Insider Trading Rules Index comprises ten items.  Market Manipulation Rules Index 
encompasses a total of 14 items, which include price manipulation (seven items), volume 
manipulation (two items), spoofing (three items), and false disclosure (two items).  Broker-
Agency Conflict Rules Index comprises five items.  However, it is possible that certain rules are 
relatively more important, but we do not have enough degrees of freedom to treat each rule 
separately.  Plausible adjustments to different weightings do not materially change the empirical 
results reported below. 
 
The Insider Trading Rules and Market Manipulation Rules Indices also consider 
securities regulation provisions when they are specific about the regulations pertaining to trading 
on stock exchanges.  Our analyses of securities codes revealed a couple of cases where the 
trading rules were more detailed in securities law.  In China, we use the rules of the China 
Securities and Regulatory Commission for the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges.  In Canada, 
the pertinent rules are found in the Universal Market Integrity Rules, which come from an 
independent regulatory body known as the Investment Industry Regulatory Commission of 
Canada.  By contrast, the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index does not consider professional 
association rules, such as that of the Chartered Financial Analysts Code of Professional Conduct.  
The reason for this exclusion is that the exchange members are not obligated to be a part of these 
different professional associations in order to trade on the exchange. 
 
2.2. Testable hypotheses 
 
                                               
     
4
 The equal weighting is consistent with the approach used in most law and finance studies, such as 
those by La Porta et al. (1998, 2006). 
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Following market microstructure literature, we focus on the three major measures of 
liquidity: velocity, volatility, and bid-ask spread.  Trading velocity is defined as the domestic 
share turnover per domestic market capitalization (World Federation of Exchanges, 2006–2008).  
High velocity is associated with the high turnover of stock, which means that shares change hands 
more frequently, implying a more liquid market.  On the other hand, following Roll (1988), 
Massimb and Phelps (1994), and Madhavan et al. (2005), higher volatility implies lower liquidity. 
Bid-ask spread is the compensation for providing immediacy, which a trader receives for the risks 
that he might have to unwind his position at a loss in the future. A smaller spread is associated 
with higher liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988; Massimb and Phelps, 1994).  
 
Below we test the proposition that explicit rules pertaining to insider trading, market 
manipulation as well as broker-agency conflict enhance investor confidence, mitigate abuse, and 
thereby facilitate trading activity.  In other words, the central hypothesis considered herein is that 
vague exchange trading rules do not provide adequate guidance and information for investors 
and/or traders, who are not sufficiently clear as to which activities are unacceptable, and as such 
investors and traders are less likely to trade in the market for fear that it is more likely to be 
manipulated.  The competing hypothesis is that detailed regulations give rise to loopholes that 
investors and traders can take advantage of, thereby creating inefficiencies and lowering trading 
activity.  A priori, our expectation is that the latter effect is outweighed by the former, as detailed 
regulations can signal to market participants that exchanges actively monitor and enforce 
regulations pursuant to investor protection (see, generally, Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  We 
therefore expect that detailed trading rules enhance velocity, and reduce stock market volatility 
and bid-ask spreads.  
 
In addition to differences in levels of rule detail across countries, in our analysis we also 
make use of a material change to trading rules across countries due to the Directive on Markets in 
Financial Instruments (MiFID).  In November 2007, MiFID, an European-wide harmonization 
directive, became effective.  Because the timing, motivation and content of MiFID was not 
instigated by any one specific European exchange or European country, but at the European 
Union level, this legislative change can be regarded as exogenous, thereby providing a useful test 
of causality between rules and liquidity.  We expect that the substantial details provided in MiFID 
enhanced investor protection and facilitated liquidity.  The next sections of the paper test these 




3. The sample and summary statistics 
 
3.1 The sample 
 
Our sample comprises 42 stock exchanges that are members of the World Federation of 
Exchanges (2006–2008) and are included in commonly used data sources such as Thomson 
Reuters Datastream.  The sample comprises Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bermuda, Brazil, 
Canada, China (Shanghai and Shenzhen), Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, India (Bombay and the National Stock Exchange of India), Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Jordon, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, OMX 
(Sweden, Finland, Denmark), Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the U.K., and the U.S. (NASDAQ and NYSE). 
Trading rules for these stock exchanges are found on the each exchange's webpage, with the sole 
exception of China, where the pertinent trading rules for the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange 
are found on the China Securities and Regulatory Commission webpage. 
 
The definitions of the variables used in the analyses are provided in Table 1.  From the 
World Federation of Exchanges (2006–2008), we use the annualized monthly trading velocity 
values for February 2006 – October 2008; the period considered by this study. The domestic 
market capitalization at the end of each month, monthly total value of share trading, and data for 
the total number of trades for each stock exchange are also obtained from the World Federation of 
Exchanges. Volatility and bid-ask spreads for each exchange are based on the stocks that 
comprise the exchange’s main index, for all exchanges, from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
Firm volatility is the annualized monthly volatility calculated using the prior 60 months of 
returns. Volatility of each marketplace is the month-end firm capitalization weighted average of 
the firm volatilities. Following Chordia et al. (2002), we compute the value-weighted quoted 
spread for each exchange. The percentage quoted bid-ask spread of each is the difference between 
the ask and bid price divided by the mid-point of the bid and ask price,5 which is then averaged to 
calculate the spread of the exchange, weighted by firm market capitalization. If the month-end 
spread is missing due to market close, the nearest prior day with a non-missing spread is used for 
the calculation. 
                                               
     
5
 The percentage quoted bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 5% level due to the existence of 
negative quoted spreads in Datastream (on select days due to timing of reported values).  For consistency, 
volatility and velocity are likewise winsorized at the 5% level.  Our analyses are robust to winsorizing at 




Following Röell (1992), we define a hybrid exchange-dummy variable to control for the 
impact of market structure on liquidity. This dummy is set to equal one for exchanges with both 
floor trading and limit order book, and zero otherwise. The microstructure data listed in Table 1 
are collected from various sources including the exchange webpages, directories, and handbooks, 
as well as the World Federation of Exchanges (2006–2008) and Yahoo Finance.  
 
Surveillance data are used from Cumming and Johan (2008).  Cumming and Johan 
surveyed 25 exchanges around the world to ascertain the extent of single- and cross-market 
surveillance.  The data were obtained confidentially for the period 2004–2005 because a would-
be manipulator might trade in ways that could not be detected if precise information about 
surveillance activity was available.6  The data are based on an equally weighted index that adds 
one every time a different type of single- and cross-market manipulation is monitored.  We use 
the principal components of domestic- and cross-market surveillance to mitigate collinearity 
associated with other microstructure and country-specific variables of interest. 
 
We also acquire a series of law and finance indices from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) and 
Spamann (2009), which include efficiency of the judiciary, anti-director rights, and liability 
standards.7  Other legal indices were considered, but they did not impact the empirical tests 
reported below and are therefore excluded for conciseness.8  To control for the influence of 
market specific changes, we draw a series MSCI Global Standard Index from Morgan Stanley 
Capital International’s webpage, and add year-dummy variables in our multivariate analyses.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
 
 Table 2 provides summary statistics of the trading rule variables collected for this paper.  
There are three primary legal indices introduced: the Insider Trading Rules Index, the Market 
                                               
     
6
 Comparable data for the 2006–2008 time period were not forthcoming from the exchanges in our 
sample, and as such this surveillance data represent a proxy for the monitoring activity of the 2006–2008 
time period in which we have trading rule data and changes over time from MiFID. 
     
7
 Where these variables are not defined for a particular country, we use the average value of the 
legal origin family for that particular country. As a robustness check in the empirical tests provided below, 
we exclude these countries from the data and find the results do not materially change.  Further, our results 
pertaining to the trading rule indices are invariant to use of the La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) indices versus 
Spamann’s (2009) index for anti-director rights and other updates, as well as other variables from Jackson 
and Roe (2009). 
     
8
 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.  Extra details and empirical tests with additional 
indices are available upon request. 
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Manipulation Rules Index, and the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index. The Market 
Manipulation Rules Index consists of four subcomponents: the Price Manipulation Rules Index, 
the Volume Manipulation Rules Index, the Spoofing Manipulation Rules Index, and the False 
Disclosure Rules Index.  These indices are summarized in Table 2 for the year 2008.  As 
discussed above in Section 2, the indices are created by summing up the number of specific 
provisions in the exchange trading rules in each country.  The Insider Trading Rules Index varies 
from a low value of zero (for a number of exchanges listed in Table 2) to ten (for NASDAQ).  
The Market Manipulation Rules Index varies from a low value of zero (for Chile, Peru, 
Philippines, and Turkey) to 13 (for London, NYSE, Euronext Paris, and Slovenia).  The Broker-
Agency Conflict Rules Index varies from a low value of zero (for a number of exchanges listed in 
Table 2) to five (for NASDAQ).  
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
 Table 3 indicates the summary statistics for all of the country-years in the data.  The 
average monthly velocity in the sample is 95.1%, and the median is 70.9%.  The range is 11.5% 
to 218.3%.  One standard deviation in velocity is 63.2%.  The average annualized market 
capitalization weighted volatility is 31.9%, with a range between 21.1% and 48.5%. The average 
bid-ask spread is 0.75%, with a minimum of 0.10% and a max of 7.4%.  The number of non-
missing country-month observations for velocity is 1363 due to the coverage by the World 
Federation of Exchanges.9  The number of country-month observations with non-missing 
volatility data is 1319 and non-missing spread data is 988 due to Datastream coverage.10  Table 3 
also provides summary statistics for the legal indices and MSCI and GDP per capita. 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
 Table 4 provides a comparison of means and medians tests of volume in relation to 
different cutoff values, which are the median value of the legal indices. Part 1 of Panel A reports 
differences in means and medians of velocity for the full sample of all country-years in the data.  
The data indicate velocity is significantly higher for higher values in the Insider Trading Rules 
                                               
     
9
 Velocity data from the World Federation of Exchanges is available monthly from February 2006 
for most countries except Jordan where data start in January 2008. 
     
10
 For example, Datastream does not cover the bid and ask price for Argentina, Columbia, Peru, 
Chile, India (both Bombay and the National Stock Exchange of India), Israel and Bermuda. The bid and 
ask price data types for the Canadian market begin from  November 27, 2006.  
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Index.  The average (median) velocity is 111.9% (72.2%) for exchanges with three or more 
insider trading rules, and is 80.8% (55.7%) for exchanges with values of zero or one in the Insider 
Trading Rules Index.  Similar results are observed for differences in the Market Manipulation 
Rules Index.  The average (median) velocity is 113.4% (63.6%) for exchanges with five or more 
market manipulation rules, and is 68.9% (54.5%) for exchanges with four or fewer market 
manipulation rules.  These differences in means and medians are statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  Likewise, the subcomponents of the Market Manipulation Rules Index show statistically 
significant differences at the 1% level for price manipulation, volume manipulation, spoofing, 
and false disclosure.  We compare the results with an Investor Protection Index, which is the 
principal component of (1) anti-director rights, (2) disclosure requirements, and (3) liability 
standards (La Porta et al., 2006; see also Spamann, 2009).  Unlike the results for our Insider 
Trading Rules Index and Market Manipulation Indices, there are no significant differences for the 
Investor Protection Index either in terms of means or medians.  Nevertheless, the La Porta et al. 
(2006) Investor Protection Index does show significant differences at the 1% level for values of 
three or more versus values of two or less.  This latter result indicates that the trading rules 
indices in this paper might be correlated with other legal differences across countries, such as the 
Investor Protection Index, and hence in our empirical assessment of trading rules on trading 
velocity below we control for other legal and economic differences across countries. 
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
 Part 2 of Panel A of Table 4 considers differences in the indices for the subset of 
European exchanges for which MiFID applies.  The results are broadly consistent with those 
reported in Part 1 of Panel A, with a few exceptions.  The mean and median values of velocity for 
the Market Manipulation Rules Index are not significantly different, as are the mean and median 
values for price. The velocity is significantly lower for exchanges with a higher value in the False 
Disclosure Rules Index, the opposite of that of the whole sample.  Nevertheless, the differences in 
means and medians for the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index and the Investor Protection 
Index are statistically significant. 
 
Part 3 of Panel C of Table 4 compares velocity for the pre- and post-MiFID time periods 
(pre-November 2007 and post-November 2007) for both the exchanges affected by MiFID 
(“MiFID exchanges”) and exchanges not affected by MiFID (“non-MiFID exchanges”) in the 
data.  The data indicate that for the MiFID exchanges both average and median velocity was 
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significantly higher after MiFID (average of 126.7% and median of 137.3%) than before MiFID 
(average of 113.7% and median of 127.6%).  For the non-MiFID exchanges, both average and 
median velocities were not statistically different pre- and post-November 2007 (averages were 
78.0% and 82.7%, and medians were 56.3% and 67.9%, respectively). 
 
 Table 4 Panel B Part 1 presents the differences in means and medians of volatility for the 
full sample and the subsample in which MiFID applies. The results are generally consistent with 
our hypotheses. Both mean and median tests of the full sample show that market capitalization 
weighted volatility is significantly lower for exchanges with higher exchange rule indices, except 
for the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index. The tests in Part 2 of Panel B that use MiFID 
country data support our central hypothesis for the Market Manipulation Rules Index and all of its 
subcomponent indices, but not the Insider Trading Rules, Broker-Agency Conflict Rules, and 
Investor Protection Indices.  Part 3 of Panel B shows that average and median volatility is smaller 
after November 2007 for MiFID exchanges and those differences are significant at the 1% level, 
and the non-MiFID exchanges observe a slight increase in volatility but this change is 
insignificant.  Again, these findings support our central hypothesis. 
 
Table 4 Panel C provides comparison results for the bid-ask spread. The data indicate that 
the Insider Trading Rules Index, the Market Manipulation Rules Index, and its subcomponent 
indices are associated with a smaller bid-ask spread for the full sample in Part 1 of Panel C. In 
Part 2 of Panel C, the subset of exchanges affected by MiFID provides inconsistent results; only a 
higher Volume Manipulation Rules Index is associated with a lower bid-ask spread.  Part 3 of 
Panel C shows the comparison of pre- and post- bid-ask spreads. It indicates that there is no 
significant change in spread for MiFID exchanges, but there is a significant increase in spreads 
after November 2007 for non-MiFID exchanges.   
 
Taken together, these statistics show there is a material effect of MiFID on liquidity 
measures, which is consistent with our hypothesis that MiFID has a positive impact on market 
liquidity.  The evidence of changes in liquidity in the post-MiFID period also indicate the need to 
assess difference-in-differences tests in the econometric tests.  As well, the differences over time 
suggest a need to control for market factors in assessing the determinants of liquidity. 
 
 Table 5 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests 
provided in the next section.  As predicted, there is a strong positive correlation between trading 
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velocity and the Insider Trading Rules Index (0.33), the Market Manipulation Rules Index (0.38), 
its subcomponent indices, as well as the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index, all of which are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  GDP per capita is likewise highly positively correlated 
with trading velocity (0.39). Volatility is also highly correlated with trading volume, numbers of 
trades, and market capitalization. Similarly, volatility and bid-ask spread are negatively 
significantly correlated with the trading rule indices, which is consistent with our central 
hypothesis.   
 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
4. Multivariate analyses 
 
In this section, we consider whether MiFID has an impact on market liquidity, and which 
legal factors are most closely associated with cross-sectional differences in liquidity, while 
controlling for other economic and institutional determinants of trading activity. We consider 
each exchange-month from February 2006 to October 2008 as a separate observation (1363 
observations), with consideration to differences in rules over time as well as difference-in-
differences regressions and country-dummy variables as well as country fixed-effects.  We cluster 
standard errors by exchange (as in Petersen, 2009), and considered other checks for treating 
standard errors for panel data sets (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2004), which we found to be quite robust.  
For each regression, we control for economic factors including market capitalization, market 
conditions (MSCI index), GDP, and exchange institutional features (Röell, 1992), as well as 
exchange fixed-effect, and year-effect. 
 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
Panel A, B, and C of Table 6 examine the effect of MiFID and exchange trading rules on 
velocity, volatility, and bid-ask spread, respectively. In each of the three panels we present ten 
identical regressions to show robustness to alternative specifications.  The first two models in 
each panel present the difference-in-difference regressions. We add an indicator variable (After) 
which is set to one in the month after November 2008, and zero in all other months. We also 
include an indicator variable (Treat) which is set to one for exchanges subject to MiFID. The 
interaction variable labeled Treat*After is the key variable in our experiment. Under the null 
hypothesis that MiFID encourages trading activity, and reduces market volatility and bid-ask 
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spread, we expect the coefficient associated with this variable to be statistically positive in Panel 
A, but statistically negative in Panel B and C.  
 
In Model (1) of Panel A, the coefficient associated with the interaction variable is 0.087, 
significant at the 1% level, which means that, after November 2007, MiFID exchanges 
experienced an incremental increase of 8.7% in velocity compared to non-MiFID exchanges. The 
effect is estimated at 4.7% in Model (2) of Panel A, when control variables for surveillance and 
enforcement are added.  Similar results are observed in Panel B and C. After MiFID is put into 
force, MiFID exchanges see a decrease of 4.1% (Model 11) to 3.8% (Model 12) in volatility, 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Panel C shows that MiFID decreases bid-ask 
spreads in Europe by a significant 6 (Model 12) to 20 (Model 11) basis points.  The evidence is 
robust to country-dummy variables for each exchange to pick up other exchange-specific factors 
that can influence market liquidity. As well, the results are robust to controls for changes in 
economic conditions over time in the MSCI index, differences in market capitalization, market 
structure, and GDP, among other variables considered, but not included for conciseness. The 
results provide strong support for our hypothesis that the rules introduced by MiFID helps to 
enhance market liquidity.  
 
In Models (3) – (9), (13) – (19), and (23) – (29), we assess the impact of each trading rule 
index on market liquidity measures separately.  The liquidity measure is regressed on each index 
separately along with a group of control variables.  Models (10), (20), and (3) consider a number 
of different indices jointly in the same regression.  We do not include every trading rule index 
jointly in the same regression due to collinearity; rather, we only include the Insider Trading, 
Price, and Volume Manipulation Rules Indices in the same regression. 
 
Model (3) reports the result of the regression on the Insider Trading Rules Index. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, trading velocity is 0.069 higher when there is an increase in the 
Insider Trading Rules Index by one in Model (3), but this effect is marginally insignificant. 
Likewise, volatility is 2.8% lower when the Insider Trading Rules Index increases by one (Model 
13), and this effect is significant at the 1% level. Panel C Model (23) indicates that a one point 
increase in the Insider Trading Rules Index value is associated with a three basis point decrease in 
the bid-ask spread, and this effect is significant at the 5% level. One likely explanation for this 
result is that stricter rules discourage insider trading, which decreases the informational content of 




In Models (4) – (6) we observe the Market Manipulation Rules Index, Price Manipulation 
Rules Index, and Volume Manipulation Rules Index positively associated with velocity, and these 
effects are significant at the 10% level in Models (4) and (5) and the 1% level in Model (6).  The 
effect of the Volume Manipulation Rules Index shows greater economic significance (0.210) 
relative to that of Market Manipulation Rules Index (0.013) and Price Manipulation Rules Index 
(0.021).  When these variables are combined together in Model (10), the Volume Manipulation 
Rules Index is statistically significant at the 1% level and the other trading rule indices are 
insignificant.  The Spoofing and False Disclosure Rules Indices in Models (7) and (8) are 
statistically insignificant, and the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index is negative and significant 
(although the latter variable is insignificant in a more parsimonious specification). 
 
The Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index is not statistically significant for liquidity in 
each panel.  One likely explanation for this result is that traders and/or brokers are bound by rules 
of conduct formulated by professional associations that vary from country to country, span 
different countries, and have different affiliations within each country.11  Importantly, this finding 
highlights the fact that the significance of the Insider Trading Rules Index and the Market 
Manipulation Rules Index (and its subcomponents) is not merely a spurious indication that 
detailed rule drafters are more likely to reside in certain countries, as the details regarding broker-
agency conflict are not statistically related to trading velocity.   
 
In Panel B Models (13) – (19), volatility is negatively associated with all four market 
manipulation rules indices but not with the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index. All coefficients 
are significant at the 1% level except the False Disclosure Rules Index, which is significant at 
10% level. The results are stronger for the Volume Manipulation Rules Index (4.3% economic 
significance).  But in Model (20) when indices are combined in the same regression, the Price 
Manipulation Rules Index is the one that remains statistically significant and shows a 1.5% drop 
in volatility for a one point increase in the index. 
 
In Panel C, Models (23) – (30) show that, among the different indices, the Insider 
Trading Rules Index is most closely statistically and negatively related to the bid-ask spread.  An 
                                               
     
11
 A second explanation is that brokers play less of a role as a financial intermediary offering advice 
in some countries, such as China. We considered this possibility by excluding such countries and found the 
results to be very similar. 
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increase in the Insider Trading Rules Index by one point reduces the bid-ask spread by 3.14 basis 
points in Model (23) and 4.77 basis points in Model (30) and these effects are significant at the 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In all models, except Models (1), (11) and (21), we add the surveillance variable in order 
to control for the potential influence of the detection of illegal-trading behaviors on the inferences 
(as in Cumming and Johan, 2008).  In addition, we also add a variable for the Efficiency of the 
Judiciary as a proxy for enforcement.  Further, in Models (10), (20) and (30) we add the Investor 
Protection Index (defined in Table 1).  The latter two variables are more closely related to the 
enforcement of corporate governance rules against corporate self-dealing and the expense of 
outside shareholders, and as such are imperfect proxies for the enforcement of secondary trading 
rules.  We consider other variables from La Porta et al. (2006) and Jackson and Roe (2009) but 
they do not materially impact our analyses pertaining to the trading-rules variables of interest.  
We note that the inclusion of these control variables in the regression has no effect on the 
statistical significance of the Treat*After interaction term, although the magnitude of the changes 
is reduced in Panels A and C and slightly reduced in Panel B: see Models (1) versus (2), (11) 
versus (12), and (21) versus (22). The coefficient of surveillance variable generally shows a 
significant improvement in liquidity, consistent with Cumming and Johan (2008).  The negative 
and significant coefficient for the efficiency of the judiciary supports La Porta et al. (1998, 2006).  
The Investor Protection Index coefficient estimate in Model (10) is sensitive to the other included 
variables; for example if we exclude the Efficiency of the Judiciary variable then the Investor 
Protection Index is positive and significant.  But regardless, the addition or subtraction of these or 
other variables does not materially impact our reported results for the trading rule indices. 12 
 
A number of our additional control variables for market microstructure, market 
conditions, and other country factors are statistically significant.  For example, velocity and 
volatility are greater for our various proxies for exchange size, and bid-ask spreads are smaller.  
However, when we add or subtract other microstructure variables (e.g., such as those in Panel C) 
in any of the Models (1) – (30) and country or market variables, we do not find different results 
pertaining to our findings regarding trading rules. 
                                               
     
12
  The Public Enforcement Index (La Porta et al. 2006) has a 0.72 correlation with the Investor 
Protection Index.  Inclusion of this variable influences the coefficient estimates for the Investor Protection 
Index, but does not influence the other variables of interest in our analyses.  Similarly, the inclusion or 
exclusion Criminal Enforcement Index (La Porta et al. 2006) and additional variables from Jackson and 




In summary, Table 6 indicates that a variety of specifications  that include exchange-
dummy variables, exchange fixed-effects, exchange institutional features, and surveillance 
applications, among other things, show that trading rules facilitate trading velocity, reduce market 
volatility, and reduce trading cost across exchanges and over time. In general, MiFID is an 
important factor in terms of improving market activities as evidenced by our difference-in-
differences regressions. Considering different indices in the same regression, the Volume 
Manipulation Rules Index is most closely connected to trading velocity, the Price Manipulation 
Rules index is most closely connected to volatility, and the Insider Trading Rules Index is most 
closely connected to bid-ask spreads.  Overall, insider trading rules and market manipulation 
rules are important for facilitating trading activity and decreasing volatility.  
 
Further to our cross-sectional and time series specifications in Table 6, in a prior version 
of the paper we reported cross-sectional regressions (42 observations) following nearly identical 
methods as in La Porta et al. (2006).  Also, we considered the use of instruments as in La Porta et 
al.  Further, we presented partial regression plots for some of the trading rule indices.  Those 
results are available on request and consistent with the findings reported here.  As well, we note 
that we considered other robustness checks not presented herein, such as excluding various 
exchanges from the analyses, two-step regression methods to account for missing observations, 
and subsamples with different time periods.  Again, those checks showed results that are quite 




In this paper, we contribute to the literature on international differences in stock 
exchanges by examining the effect of trading rules on liquidity as represented by velocity, 
volatility and bid-ask spread.  Building on prior work on mandatory disclosure and delegation 
between private and public enforcement of securities laws (La Porta et al., 2006; Hail and Leuz, 
2006; Jackson and Roe, 2009) and surveillance technology and information sharing in ex post 
enforcement (Cumming and Johan, 2008), in this paper, we consider the interaction between rule 
specificity in stock exchange trading rules and stock exchange trading activity. 
 
We employ a sample of 42 exchanges around the world and find that stock exchange 
trading activity is most closely related to trading rules specificity in regard to insider trading and 
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market manipulation, but is not statistically related to rules pertaining to broker-agency conflict.  
The reasoning behind this finding is that insider trading and market manipulation rules provide 
clarity regarding prohibited manipulative trading practices and are of direct and central 
importance to the conduct of market participants.  By contrast, broker-agency conflict rules are 
typically subject to extraneous rules from governing bodies and professional associations for 
brokers (such as the Chartered Financial Analysts Institute).  The connection between trading 
activity and insider trading and market manipulation rules is robust to concerns about 
endogeneity, difference-in-differences specifications, and alternative control variables.  
Specifically, we observe the material impact of the MiFID rule changes on all dimensions of 
liquidity.  Although it is difficult to isolate precisely the components of trading rules that matter 
the most, it is noteworthy that we do observe a close connection between the Volume 
Manipulation Rules Index and trading velocity, the Price Manipulation Rules index and volatility, 
and the Insider Trading Rules Index and bid-ask spreads.  The results indicate trading rules are an 
important source of information to consider in explaining the differences in trading activity 
among stock exchanges around the world.  Future work might look to the exchange trading rules 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
This table defines the variables, including the trading rule indices.  Variables used in subsequent tables are highlighted in bold font. 
Variable Name Definition 
Insider Trading Rules  
Front-running A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit a broker's house or employee account from buying/selling 
in a period shortly prior to significant buying/selling by a client. 
Client Precedence A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit a broker from violating the time priority of client orders. 
Trading Ahead of Research 
Reports 
A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit brokers with proprietary access to research reports from 
trading ahead of the release of the research report. 
Separations of Research and 
Trading A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify that research departments and trading departments must have a 
'Chinese wall' separating these departments. 
Broker Ownership Limit A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify maximum ownership limits for brokerages and/or employees with 
respect to any given security. 
Restrictions on Affiliation A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify limits or restrictions on affiliation between exchange members and 
member companies. 
Restrictions on Communications A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify limits or restrictions on brokerages' communications with the public. 
Investment Company Securities A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify restrictions or bans on the trading of members' own or affiliated 
investment company securities. 
Influencing or Rewarding 
Employees of Others A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify bans on any means of influencing or rewarding employees of other members or member companies. 
Anti-Intimidation/ Coordination A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify bans on any form of intimidation of or coordination with other 
members or member companies. 
Insider Trading Rules Index 
Sum of dummy variables for Front-running, Client Precedence, Trading Ahead of Research Reports, Separation of Research and 
Trading, Broker Ownership Limit, Restrictions on Affiliation, Restrictions on Communications, Investment Company 
Securities, Influencing or Rewarding the Employees of Others, and Anti-Intimidation / Coordination. 
Price Manipulation Rules  
Marking the Open A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit the placing of purchase orders at slightly higher prices or 
sale orders at lower prices to drive up/suppress the price of the securities when the market opens. 
Marking the Close A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit the buying or selling of securities at the close of the market 
in an effort to alter the closing price of the security. 
Misleading End of the 
Month/Quarter/Year Trades A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit transactions executed at a particular date to establish gains or losses or conceal portfolio losses or true positions in connection with end of the month/quarter/year. 
Intraday 
Ramping/ Gouging A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit the execution of a series of trades over a short time period that generates a price movement over that period in which it is unusual, given the trading history of the security. 
Market Setting A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit market setting by crossing in the short term, high or low.  
For example, this could be done to set the VWAP (volume weighted average price) or cross market (setting the price in one 
market to justify crossing in the follow-on market). 
Pre-Arranged Trades 
A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit pre-arranged trades within an extremely short time period 
whereby the client broker and another broker enter a bid and ask for the same volume and price, which then generates a trade 
between the two brokers for the whole of the volume. The volume of the order must be significant given the trading history of 
the security. 
Domination and Control 
A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit a broker/client from generating significantly greater price 
changes in a security, possibly for corners (securing control of the bid/demand-side of both the derivative and the underlying 
asset, and the dominant position can be exploited to manipulate the price of the derivative and/or the asset), squeezes (taking 
advantage of a shortage in an asset by controlling the demand-side and exploiting market congestion during such shortages in a 
way as to create artificial prices), and mini-manipulations (trading in the underlying security of an option in order to manipulate 
its price so that the options will become in-the-money). 
Price Manipulation Rules Index Sum of dummy variables for Marking the Open, Marking the Close, Misleading End of the Month/Quarter/Year Trades, Intraday Ramping / Gouging, Market Setting, Pre-arranged Trades, and Domination and Control. 
Volume Manipulation Rules  
Churning A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit excessive buying and selling of stocks by a trader such as a broker in order to generate large commission fees (in the case of churning client accounts) and/or the appearance of significant 
volume (in the case of churning house accounts and/or churning client accounts) 
Wash Trade A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit the same client reference on both sides of a trade. 
Volume Manipulation Rules 





Table 1. (Continued) 
Variable Name Definition 
Spoofing Rules  
Giving up Priority A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit brokers from giving up priority, such as entering a bid/ask for a significant quantity at a price away from priority and then both cancelling this order as it approaches 
priority, and  re-entering the order shortly thereafter at a price level further away from priority. 
Switch A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit brokers from entering fictitious orders, such as 
entering a significant quantity at or close to priority, then completing a trade on the opposite side of the market, and 
thereafter deleting the original order shortly after the completion of the opposite order. 
Layering of Bids/Asks A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit brokers from layering bids/asks, such as  stagger 
orders from the same client reference at different price and volume levels, with the intent of giving a false or misleading 
appearance with respect to the market for the security.  
Spoofing Rules Index Sum of dummy variables for Giving up Priority, Switch and Layering of Bids/Asks. 
False Disclosure Rules  
Dissemination of False and Misleading 
Information 
A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit the dissemination of false or misleading market 
information. 
Parking or Warehousing A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit hiding the true ownership of securities by creating 
a set of fictitious transactions and trades. 
False Disclosure Rules Index Sum of dummy variables for Dissemination of False and Misleading Information and Parking or Warehousing. 
Market Manipulation Rules Index Sum of Price Manipulation Rules Index, Volume Manipulation Rules Index, Spoofing Rules Index, and False Disclosure Rules Index. 
Broker-Agency Rules  
Trade Through A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit the completion of a client's order at a price inferior 
to the best posted bid or ask; e.g., the market maker who received the order is unable or unwilling to fill it at the best 
posted bid or ask price, and hence the trade is instead executed at the market maker's price. 
Improper Execution A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules explicitly prohibit brokers from charging fees for completing a client 
order are unwarranted given the circumstances. 
Restrictions on Member Use of Exchange 
Name A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify restrictions on exchange members' use of the exchange name. 
Restrictions on Sales Materials and 
Telemarketing 
A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify restrictions on exchange members' nature of sales and 
telemarketing. 
Fair Dealing with Customers 
A dummy variable equal to one if the trading rules specify details with respect to the "know your client rule" that 
requires brokerages to not make trades that do not fit within the clients interest, no delays in the handling of client orders, 
and the like. 
Broker-Agency Index Sum of dummy variables for Trade Through, Improper Execution, Restrictions on Member Use of Exchange Name, Restrictions on Sales Materials and Telemarketing, and Fair Dealing with Customers. 
Surveillance, Efficiency of Judiciary, and 
Investor Protection Indices  
Surveillance Index 
The principal component of (1) single market surveillance and (2) cross market surveillance.  Source: Cumming and 
Johan (2008).  Available for a subset of countries, and provided contingent on maintaining confidentiality and anonymity 
as exchanges do not want market participants to know all of the things they do and do not look for in their surveillance. 
Efficiency of the Judiciary Index Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment.  Scale from zero to 10; with lower scores, lower 
efficiency levels.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Investor Protection Index The principal component of (1) Anti-Director Rights, (2) Disclosure Requirements, and (3) Liability Standards.  Sources: La Porta et al. (2006), Spamann (2009). 
Market Statistics  
Velocity 
The ratio between the turnover of domestic shares and their market capitalization. The value is annualized by multiplying 
the monthly moving average by 12, according to the following formula: Monthly Domestic Share Turnover / Month-end 
Domestic Market Capitalization.  Only domestic shares are used in order to be consistent.  Source: World Federation of 
Exchanges (2006–2008). 
Volatility 
Volatility of each firm is calculated using the prior 60 month returns. For each exchange, the volatility is the firm market 
capitalization weighted average of the volatilities of the firms consisting of average, and then annualized. Firm market 
capitalization is equal to the product of month-end shares outstanding and stock prices, or the mid-price of bid and ask 
prices, if stock price is missing. The monthly return, share outstanding and stock price are from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. 
Bid-Ask Spread 
The relative quoted spread of each firm is the difference between the monthly bid and ask prices, divided by the mid-
point price. For each exchange, the relative quoted spread is the firm market capitalization weighted average of the 
spreads of the firms that its major index consists of. Firm market capitalization is equal to the product of month-end 
shares outstanding and stock prices, or the mid-price of bid and ask prices, if stock price is missing. The bid and ask 




Table 1. (Continued) 
Variable Name Definition 
Log (Market Capitalization) Log of domestic market capitalization in USD millions in the same period relative to the measure of velocity. Market 
capitalization is from World Federation of Exchanges (2006-2008). 
Hybrid Exchange A dummy variable equal to one for exchanges with both floor trading and limit order book. 
Log (Volume) Log of total value of shares trading in USD millions in the same period relative to the measure of velocity. Total value of 
share trading data is from World Federation of Exchanges (2006–2008). 
Log (Number of Trades) Log of total number of trades in thousands in the same period relative to the measure of velocity. Numbers of trades are from World Federation of Exchanges (2006–2008). 
Log (1+MSCI) Log of one plus the MSCI index in the lagged period relative to the measure of velocity 







Table 2. Trading Rule Indices  
This table summarizes the index values for the trading rules for each exchange, as defined in Table 1.  Values are presented for 2008. The *, **, *** denote significance 






















English Legal Origin        
Australia 3 1 2 0 6 2 0 
Bermuda 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 
Bombay 0 1 1 1 3 2 3 
Canada 7 2 3 0 12 2 1 
Hong Kong 3 2 1 1 7 0 0 
India NSE 3 1 1 1 6 3 3 
Ireland 7 1 3 1 12 2 0 
Israel 2 0 0 1 3 1 0 
London 7 2 3 1 13 3 0 
Malaysia 0 0 1 1 2 7 2 
NASDAQ 5 1 3 2 11 10 5 
New Zealand 2 0 1 1 4 3 3 
NYSE 6 2 3 2 13 7 3 
Singapore 3 1 2 1 7 2 2 
Sri Lanka 2 1 0 1 4 4 2 
Thailand 4 2 1 1 8 1 0 
Average English Legal Origin 3.50 1.13 1.63 1.00 7.25 3.19 1.63 
French Legal Origin        
Argentina 2 0 1 0 3 3 1 
Brazil 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Columbia 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Egypt 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 
France 7 1 3 2 13 2 0 
Greece 7 1 3 1 12 3 0 
Indonesia 1 0 1 1 3 2 1 
Italy 7 1 3 1 12 3 0 
Jordan 1 0 1 0 2 5 3 
Mexico 3 1 1 1 6 2 0 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 7 1 3 1 12 4 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 



























German Legal Origin        
Austria 7 1 3 1 12 2 0 
Germany 7 1 3 1 12 3 0 
Korea 4 2 2 1 9 3 2 
Shanghai 2 1 1 1 5 2 0 
Shenzhen 2 1 1 1 5 2 0 
Slovenia 7 1 3 2 13 3 0 
Switzerland 7 1 3 1 12 3 1 
Taiwan 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Tokyo 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 
Average German Legal Origin 4.33 0.89 1.89 0.89 8.00 2.11 0.33 
Scandinavian Legal Origin        
OMX 7 1 3 1 12 5 2 
Oslo 7 1 3 1 12 4 0 
Average Scandinavian Legal Origin 7.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 12.00 4.50 1.00 
Tests of Means        
English versus Civil Law -0.05 2.58** 0.23 1.94* 0.68 1.58 2.98*** 
English versus French 0.91 0.92 0.54 0.62 2.59** 1.56 1.40 
English versus German -0.83 0.27 -0.28 0.13 -0.71 1.11 1.40 
English versus Scandinavian -3.70*** 0.15 -1.57 0.00 -4.77* -1.34 0.62 
French versus German -1.71* -0.64 -0.81 -0.48 -3.23*** -0.47 0.00 
French versus Scandinavian -4.53*** -0.82 -2.09** -0.64 -7.27*** -2.95*** -0.67 





Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents statistics for the full sample of country-month observations in the data.  The data span the months from February 2006 - October 2008, and the 
exchanges listed in Table 2.  The full number of country-months in the data is 1386, but for some variables there are missing data.  Velocity data from the World 
Federation of Exchanges are not available for Jordan prior to 2008.  Bid-ask-spread data from Datastream are missing for Argentina, Athens, Bermuda, Chile, 
Columbia, India Bombay, India NSE, Israel, and Peru.  Volatility data is missing for selected months for Athens, Bermuda, and Bombay, India.  Surveillance data 
are available for select countries from Cumming and Johan (2008) as indicated in Table 1.  World Federation of Exchanges has incomplete data on the number of 
trades for Italy, Bermuda, Japan, Jordan, and Singapore for select months, and similarly for a few observations for market capitalization and volume. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observations 
Velocity 0.910 0.709 0.632 0.115 2.183 1363 
Volatility 0.319 0.295 0.083 0.211 0.485 1319 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.074 988 
Insider Trading Rules Index 2.249 2 2.109 0 10 1386 
Market Manipulation Rules Index 5.212 4 4.024 0 13 1386 
Price Manipulation Rules Index 2.600 2 2.259 0 7 1386 
Volume Manipulation Rules Index 0.680 1 0.710 0 2 1386 
Spoofing Rules Index 1.238 1 1.011 0 3 1386 
False Disclosure Rules Index 0.695 1 0.585 0 2 1386 
Broker Agency Rules Index 0.872 0 1.260 0 5 1386 
Surveillance 24.867 23.307 11.378 6.659 42.994 759 
Efficiency of the Judiciary 7.815 8 1.994 2.5 10 1386 
Investor Protection Index 2.321 2.272 0.838 0.686 3.775 1386 
Log (Market Capitalization) 12.819 12.821 1.843 7.619 16.625 1361 
Hybrid Exchange 0.359 0 0.480 0 1 1386 
Log (Volume) 9.974 10.146 2.720 0.000 15.168 1361 
Log (Number of Trades) 7.416 7.616 2.722 -1.897 13.278 1271 
Log (1+MSCI) -0.001 0.009 0.056 -0.371 0.138 1386 








Table 4. Comparison Tests 
This table presents the comparison of means and medians tests for velocity (Panel A), volatility (Panel B), and the bid-ask spread (Panel C) for different cut-off values of the indices defined in Table 1.  
In each Panel, Part 1 considers all exchanges in the dataset, Part 2 considers the subset of exchanges for which MiFID applies, and Part 3 considers pre- versus post- MiFID for the subsample of MiFID 
and non-MiFID exchanges.  The *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
Panel A. Comparison Tests for Velocity 













>2 <=2 >4 <=4 >2 <=2 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >0 <=0 >2.27 <=2.27 
Number of Observations 445 918 678 685 537 826 198 1165 384 979 90 1273 526 837 660 703 
Mean 1.119 0.808 1.134 0.689 1.105 0.783 1.216 0.858 1.331 0.745 1.614 0.860 0.864 0.939 0.896 0.923 
Standard Deviation 0.722 0.557 0.636 0.545 0.598 0.622 0.501 0.638 0.557 0.582 0.660 0.600 0.661 0.612 0.607 0.655 
Median 1.354 0.648 1.019 0.495 0.930 0.530 1.124 0.612 1.365 0.552 1.623 0.668 0.678 0.739 0.754 0.664 
Difference in Means 8.01*** 13.86*** 9.50*** 8.90*** 16.93*** 11.44*** -2.11** -0.76 
Difference in Medians p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p=0.93 













>2 <=2 >4 <=4 >2 <=2 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >0 <=0 >2.27 <=2.27 
Number of Observations 171 225 249 147 207 189 33 363 186 210 24 372 87 309 132 264 
Mean 1.425 1.002 1.169 1.209 1.173 1.197 1.498 1.156 1.299 1.083 0.770 1.211 1.366 1.133 1.354 1.100 
Standard Deviation 0.494 0.531 0.548 0.569 0.593 0.513 0.148 0.570 0.518 0.570 0.630 0.541 0.317 0.597 0.405 0.601 
Median 1.449 0.869 1.319 1.448 1.323 1.354 1.532 1.313 1.365 1.182 0.752 1.336 1.352 1.292 1.457 1.210 
Difference in Means 8.09*** -0.57 -0.57 8.68*** 3.93*** -3.83*** 4.84*** 5.84*** 
Difference in Medians p<0.00*** p=0.98 p=0.98 p<0.00*** p<0.0*** p<0.00*** p=0.02** p<0.00*** 
Part 3. Pre-MiFID versus Post-
MiFID 





Number of Observations 358 609 144 252 
Mean 0.827 0.780 1.267 1.137 
Standard Deviation 0.644 0.618 0.58 0.537 
Median 0.679 0.563 1.373 1.276 
Difference in Means 1.13 2.24** 




Table 4. (Continued) 
Panel B. Comparison Tests for Volatility 















>2 <=2 >4 <=4 >2 <=2 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >0 <=0 >2.27 <=2.27 
Number of Observations 456 863 633 686 525 794 198 1121 372 947 90 1229 515 804 659 660 
Mean 0.302 0.328 0.300 0.337 0.281 0.344 0.296 0.323 0.275 0.336 0.240 0.325 0.318 0.319 0.283 0.355 
Standard Deviation 0.078 0.084 0.080 0.082 0.063 0.085 0.076 0.084 0.065 0.083 0.016 0.083 0.082 0.084 0.062 0.086 
Median 0.282 0.296 0.271 0.338 0.260 0.342 0.259 0.301 0.250 0.331 0.239 0.307 0.321 0.293 0.261 0.366 
Difference in Means -5.38*** -8.35*** -15.49*** -4.26*** -14.08*** -29.59*** -0.23 -17.45*** 
Difference in Medians p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p=0.28 















>2 <=2 >4 <=4 >2 <=2 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >0 <=0 >2.27 <=2.27 
Number of Observations 159 204 237 126 195 168 33 330 174 189 24 339 87 276 132 231 
Mean 0.286 0.284 0.272 0.309 0.256 0.318 0.226 0.291 0.277 0.292 0.241 0.288 0.319 0.274 0.296 0.278 
Standard Deviation 0.076 0.055 0.065 0.058 0.047 0.066 0.013 0.065 0.072 0.057 0.015 0.066 0.074 0.058 0.070 0.061 
Median 0.261 0.273 0.256 0.284 0.240 0.287 0.226 0.276 0.247 0.276 0.240 0.274 0.296 0.258 0.288 0.271 
Difference in Means 0.30 -10.91*** -10.91*** -15.31*** -2.28** -9.99*** 5.19*** 7.36*** 
Difference in Medians p=0.26 p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** 
 
Part 3. Pre-MiFID versus Post-
MiFID 
Non-MiFID Countries MiFID Countries 
Post-MiFID Pre-MiFID Post-MiFID Pre-MiFID 
Number of Observations 348 608 132 231 
Mean 0.337 0.329 0.261 0.298 
Standard Deviation 0.092 0.082 0.051 0.068 
Median 0.32 0.32 0.245 0.276 
Difference in Means 1.24 -5.98*** 




Table 4. (Continued) 
Panel C. Bid-Ask Spread 















>2 <=2 >4 <=4 >2 <=2 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >0 <=0 >2.27 <=2.27 
Number of Observations 323 664 459 528 459 528 181 806 343 644 82 905 344 643 475 512 
Mean -5.648 -5.446 -5.635 -5.406 -5.715 -5.337 -5.909 -5.423 -5.841 -5.338 -6.544 -5.419 -5.454 -5.544 -5.465 -5.557 
Standard Deviation 1.053 1.007 0.981 1.053 1.025 0.995 0.973 1.017 0.937 1.029 0.881 0.987 1.031 1.023 1.006 1.043 
Median -5.572 -5.368 -5.603 -5.301 -5.841 -5.256 -6.066 -5.264 -5.936 -5.186 -6.834 -5.334 -5.446 -5.471 -5.330 -5.497 
Difference in Means -2.91*** -3.51*** -5.87*** -5.86*** -7.54*** -9.97*** 1.32 1.41 
Difference in Medians p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p=0.28 p=0.14 
















>2 <=2 >4 <=4 >2 <=2 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >1 <=1 >0 <=0 >2.27 <=2.27 
Number of Observations 151 200 183 168 183 168 32 319 163 188 22 329 85 266 128 223 
Mean -5.858 -6.026 -5.808 -6.113 -6.008 -5.895 -6.699 -5.879 -5.934 -5.972 -5.884 -5.959 -5.924 -5.964 -5.748 -6.072 
Standard Deviation 0.784 0.995 0.936 0.861 1.003 0.801 0.345 0.918 0.910 0.917 1.371 0.876 0.650 0.983 0.976 0.854 
Median -5.547 -6.372 -5.603 -6.483 -6.380 -5.683 -6.679 -5.685 -6.055 -6.311 -6.060 -6.207 -5.600 -6.368 -5.771 -6.276 
Difference in Means 1.77* 1.67* 1.67* -10.28*** 0.39 0.25 0.43 5.52*** 
Difference in Medians p=0.02*** p=0.10* p<0.00*** p<0.00*** p=0.67 p=0.80 p=0.86 p<0.00*** 
  
Part 3. Pre-MiFID versus 
Post-MiFID 
Non-MiFID 









Number of Observations 234 402 121 230 
Mean -5.119 -5.356 -5.927 -5.969 
Standard Deviation 1.032 0.978 0.984 0.874 
Median -4.972 -5.037 -6.066 -6.281 
Difference in Means 2.89*** 0.41 






Table 5. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample of country-months in the data.  Correlations in absolute value greater than .05, 0.06 and 0.07 are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Velocity 1.00              
(2) Volatility -0.04 1.00             
(3) Bid-Ask Spread -0.51 0.22 1.00            
(4) Insider Trading Rules Index 0.40 -0.29 -0.13 1.00           
(5) Market Manipulation Rules Index 0.37 -0.36 -0.24 0.49 1.00          
(6) Price Manipulation Rules Index 0.29 -0.36 -0.19 0.35 0.96 1.00         
(7) Volume Manipulation Rules Index 0.26 -0.12 -0.21 0.30 0.79 0.69 1.00        
(8) Spoofing Rules Index 0.44 -0.38 -0.28 0.57 0.91 0.83 0.63 1.00       
(9) False Disclosure Rules Index 0.33 -0.27 -0.20 0.63 0.63 0.48 0.50 0.53 1.00      
(10) Broker Agency Rules Index 0.15 -0.09 0.04 0.73 0.24 0.10 0.22 0.29 0.49 1.00     
(11) Surveillance 0.11 -0.29 -0.10 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.28 1.00    
(12) Efficiency of the Judiciary 0.15 -0.53 -0.24 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.23 0.43 0.21 0.29 0.18 1.00   
(13) Investor Protection Rules Index 0.04 -0.28 -0.13 0.34 0.24 0.15 0.33 0.27 0.18 0.45 0.13 0.44 1.00  
(14) Log (1+MSCI) -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 1.00 




Table 6. Regression Analysis of Market Liquidity 
This table presents OLS panel regressions of the determinants of market liquidity in the cross-section across countries.  Variables are as defined in Table 1.  Standard errors are clustered by country (Petersen, 2009).  Panels A, B, and C present 
regressions for the velocity, volatility, and bid-ask spread, used as the dependent variables, respectively.  The first two regressions in each panel use difference in differences estimates for the effect of MiFID (November 2007).  The third-tenth 
regression in each Panel presents a regression with the different exchange rules indices, and the final column presents a regression with multiple indices simultaneously.  The *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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After 0.019 0.858 0.055 2.719*
** 





                
Trading Rules                     
Insider Trading 




      0.013 1.847*             
Price Rules 
Index         0.021 1.925*         0.002 0.221 
Volume Rules 
Index           0.210 
4.441
*** 
      0.236 3.074*** 
Spoofing Rules 
Index             0.042 1.137       
Disclosure Rules 
Index               0.047 0.616     
Broker Agency 





Enforcement                     
Surveillance   0.012 2.315*
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0.017 1.230 0.046 5.775*** 
Efficiency of the 
Judiciary   0.650 
3.697*
** 












Protection                   -5.416 -7.150*** 
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Dummy 2007 0.018 0.712 0.004 0.266 -0.078 -2.073 0.019 0.476 0.017 0.442 0.013 0.356 0.023 0.604 0.028 0.729 0.026 0.677 0.019 0.529 
Dummy 2008 0.094 2.190
** 

































Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model 
Diagnostics                     
Number of 
Observations 1361 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 













Model 13: Insider 
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Model 14: Market 
Manipulation 
Rules Index 
















































































                    
Treat 0.048 2.593
*** 
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0.038 1.014 0.039 1.041 0.035 0.919 0.037 1.016 0.041 1.109 0.053 1.555 0.019 0.474 0.037 5.417
*** 
Market Condition 























































































Variables                     
Log(GDP) -0.014 -0.297 0.038 0.416 0.039 1.377 0.033 1.161 0.037 1.248 0.047 1.743
* 




Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Diagnostics                     
Number of 
Observations 1294 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 












Model 23: Insider 
Trading Rules 
Index 
Model 24: Market 
Manipulation 
Rules Index 











































































































                
Trading Rules                     
Insider Trading Rules 













Rules Index       
-6.937E-
04 -0.160             
Price Rules Index         -4.367E-03 -0.664         
2.108E-
05 0.205 
Volume Rules Index           3.745E-04 0.897       
3.840E-
04 1.262 
Spoofing Rules Index             3.054E-05 0.130       
Disclosure Rules 
Index               
3.006E-
04 0.670     
Broker Agency Rules 
Index                 
-3.597E-
04 -1.095   
Enforcement                     








































Efficiency of the 
































Index                   
-2.246E-
03 -1.231 















Model 23: Insider 
Trading Rules 
Index 
Model 24: Market 
Manipulation 
Rules Index 


















































































































































































































Control Variables                     

















































































Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Diagnostics                     
Number of 
Observations 921 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.804 0.801 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.801 0.801 
 
 
